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ABSTRACT
With the Department of Defense's (DoD) budget being
reduced to ever diminishing levels, DoD acquisition managers
must acquire technologically superior weapon systems within
fixed time periods with the least amount of resources. One
way they can effectively accomplish this is by using a
Nondevelopmental Item (NDI) acquisition strategy. One weapon
system program that has successfully used such an NDI strategy
is the U.S. Army's Avenger Air Defense System Program. This
thesis examines the DoD acquisition process and how NDIs are
used within the process. The thesis then analyzes the Avenger
Program and its NDI acquisition strategy to determine what
factors made the program successful. From this analysis,
lessons-learned are identified that can be used by other
acquisition managers and their staffs to effectively manage
future NDI programs. Significant lessons-learned indicate
that high-level support, a thorough market investigation and
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It has become increasingly critical that Department of
Defense (DoD) acquisition managers acquire technologically
superior weapon systems within fixed time periods with the
least amount of resources. One way they can efficiently
accomplish this is by using a Nondevelopmental Item (NDI)
acquisition strategy. One weapon system program that has used
such an NDI acquisition strategy is the U.S. Army's Avenger
Air Defense System Program.
There are two major characteristics that make the study of
the Avenger Program interesting. The first characteristic is
the success with which the Army has used an NDI acquisition
strategy to acquire a major weapon system such as the Avenger.
This is of particular interest because of the problems with
which the Army Air Defense (ADA) branch and Army acquisition
managers have had with past NDI acquisitions such as the
Roland, Sergeant York and Air Defense Anti-Tank System (ADATS)
Programs. The success of the Avenger Program has caused Army
procurement and acquisition officials to praise it lavishly as
a virtually trouble-free program [Ref. l:p. 22].
The second characteristic is that the Avenger Program used
an accelerated acquisition cycle because of the urgent need
for forward area air defense systems. This accelerated
acquisition cycle resulted in the first Avenger being
delivered only 14 months after the first contract was awarded.
This is a significant accomplishment when compared to the fact
that many DoD full-scale development programs take from 15 to
20 years to field a weapon system.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to examine the major
factors that have made the implementation of the Avenger
Program's NDI acquisition strategy successful. From this
examination, lessons-learned will be identified that will help
other acquisition managers and their staffs to effectively
manage future NDI acquisition programs. These lessons-learned




In pursuing the objectives of this thesis, the following
primary research question was addressed: What are the major
factors of the Avenger Program's NDI Acquisition Strategy that
made the program a success and what lessons can be learned
from these factors that can be applied to other acquisition
programs?
The subsidiary questions that were used to aid in
determining the answer to the primary question were:
1. How do DoD and the Army define NDI acquisition and how
is it different from other acquisition processes?
2. What are the benefits and challenges of using an NDI
acquisition strategy?
3. What is an NDI acquisition strategy and what is the
Avenger Program's NDI acquisition strategy?
4. What made the Avenger Program's NDI acquisition strategy
successful and what were the program's shortcomings?
5. What lessons-learned, that can be applied to DoD
acquisition programs in general, can be gained from the
study of the Avenger Program's NDI acquisition strategy?
D. SCOPE
This thesis covers only those aspects relating to the
program's NDI acquisition strategy. Additionally, because
this thesis focuses primarily on program management and not on
technical aspects, only a general description of the Avenger
is provided and only as much technical specificity as
necessary is included. Classified aspects of the Avenger
Program were not examined. Aspects such as system operational
requirements and threat assessments, while important to the
program, were not critical in the examination of the NDI
acquisition strategy.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
Background information was obtained from periodicals,
reports, papers, DoD documents and U.S. Army manuals. These
materials were obtained from the Defense Technical Information
Center, the Defense Logistics Systems Information Exchange and
and the Naval Postgraduate School Library. The Forward Area
Air Defense (FAAD) Project Office, which now has program
management responsibility for the Avenger, at Redstone
Arsenal, Alabama was the primary source for Avenger
information. Interviews with current and former Avenger
Program personnel were conducted and program documents were
examined. Additional program information came from the Boeing
Aerospace, Missiles & Space Division of the Boeing Defense &
Space Group, Huntsville, Alabama and the Directorate of Combat
Development, Fort Bliss, Texas.
F. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS
DoD and Army definitions and acronyms used in acquisition
management and the Avenger Program are provided throughout the
thesis where needed, and Appendix A provides a consolidated
list of acronyms.
II. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROCESS AND
NONDEVELOPMENTAL ITEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter begins with a general overview of the current
standard DoD acquisition process and acquisition strategies.
Next, NDI policy is examined by exploring the definition and
history of NDIs. Finally, the benefits and challenges of NDIs
are described.
B. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROCESS
DoD has one of the largest acquisition organizations in
the world. Its Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) budget authority for Fiscal Year (FY) 1993 was $38.2
billion and for FY 1994 it was $38.6 billion. For the
Procurement budget, DoD was authorized $53.6 billion in FY
1993 and for FY 1994 it was authorized $45.5 billion.
[Ref. 2:p. 5] To manage this acquisition organization DoD
employs over 17,000 military personnel and over 76,500
civilian employees [Ref. 3:p. 7].
This large and complex DoD acquisition structure is guided
by many external laws and regulations outlined in such
documents as Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular
A-109, Major System Acquisitions , and the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) . However, DoD has combined its acquisition
management guidance into two primary documents. The first
document is DoD Directive 5000.1, Defense Acquisition , and the
second is DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2, Defense Acquisition
Management Policies and Procedures . Together these two
documents outline the basic acquisition process for all DoD
organizations
.
DoD Directive 5000.1 provides broad basic policies
covering defense acquisitions, while DoDI 5000.2 establishes
more specific policies and procedures for managing these
programs. To manage defense acquisition programs, DoDI 5000.2
outlines an acquisition process of five phases with five
milestone reviews. The Defense Systems Management College
(DSMC) describes this acquisition process as "The sequence of
acquisition activities starting from the agency's
reconciliation of its mission needs, with its capabilities,
priorities and resources and extending through the
introduction of a system into operational use or the
otherwise successful achievement of program objectives."
[Ref. 4:p. 1.4-5]
The determination of mission need is completed by combat
developers before the first milestone review of the
acquisition process and is documented in the Mission Need
Statement (MNS) which describes a warfighting deficiency. The
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) then reviews the
MNS. Members of the JROC include the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Army
and the Air Force, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. For major
acquisition programs, the JROC forwards the MNS to the Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB) for Milestone review. The DAB is
the senior DoD acquisition review board chaired by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and includes DoD, JCS and
service representatives. For non major acquisition programs,
the Milestone review and all other Milestone reviews are
conducted at the service component level or other appropriate
level
.
Milestone 0, the Concept Studies Approval milestone, is
the decision point that begins Phase 0, the Concept
Exploration and Definition (CE/D) phase. During the CE/D
Phase various materiel alternatives are defined and analyzed
to determine the most promising system concept (s). In this
phase the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) is prepared.
It identifies required performance capabilities.
Milestone I is called Concept Demonstration Approval.
During this review the DAB determines if the results of the
CE/D phase warrant a new acquisition program. If the DAB
feels a new acquisition program is needed the program moves
into Phase I, Demonstration and Validation (DEM/VAL). During
the DEM/VAL Phase acquisition managers define critical design
characteristics and expected capabilities. Also, technologies
critical to the concept are proven and critical processes are
demonstrated.
Once the DEM/VAL Phase is complete, the program is
reviewed at Milestone II, Development Approval. At this
review the DAB determines if the results of DEM/VAL warrant
continuation. If continuation is warranted a baseline is
developed. If the DAB feels the program should continue it
moves into Phase II, Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD). During the EMD Phase acquisition managers develop the
most promising design approach into a stable, producible and
cost-effective system design.
When EMD is complete the DAB again reviews the program at
Milestone III, Production Approval. At this milestone review
the DAB determines if the results of EMD warrant the
production of the new system. If the DAB makes the decision
to produce the system, the program moves into Phase III,
Production and Deployment (P/D). During this phase the new
system is placed into full production and fielded to satisfy
the mission need. If the system fully satisfies the
operational requirements, the program moves directly into
Phase IV, Operations and Support (0/S). If the system
requires subsequent major changes, the DAB reviews the program
again at a Milestone IV review, Major Modification Approval,
before any changes are made. Figure 1 depicts DoD Acquisition
Milestones and Phases.
This acquisition process is the basic framework for all
acquisition programs. It is a long and detailed process.
There are many review and reporting requirements and test and
8
evaluation requirements that must be completed. This process
takes from 15 to 20 years for most full-scale development
systems. For example, the U.S. Army's Patriot Air Defense
System Program took 16 years to field the first system
[Ref . 5: p. 2]
.
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Figure 1 - Acguisition Milestones and Phases [Ref. 6:p. 2-1]
To help acquisition managers streamline this process, DoDI
5000.2 allows them to modify the process when it is in the
best interest of the program to do so. This is an important
point for acquisition programs using an NDI acquisition
strategy. When a program uses an NDI strategy acquisition,
acquisition managers usually modify the acquisition process in
some manner. An acquisition manager modifies the acquisition
process by developing and implementing the acquisition
strategy for the program.
C. ACQUISITION STRATEGY
An acquisition strategy is the comprehensive approach for
managing a program throughout the acquisition process. The
DSMC defines acquisition strategy as:
A combination of business and technical management
concepts designed to achieve program objectives within
imposed resource constraints. It is the framework for
managing research, development, test, production, fielding
support and other essential program activities. [Ref . 4:p.
1.5-2]
It is the Program Manager's (PM) responsibility to
formulate and execute this strategy. The main goal the PM
attempts to achieve in developing the acquisition strategy is
to " . . . minimize the time and cost of satisfying an
identified, validated need consistent with common sense, sound
business practices and the basic policies established by DoD
Directive 5000.1." [Ref. 6:p. 5-A-l]
Program managers can use many approaches, individually or
in combination, to build acquisition strategies. Besides an
NDI approach, a PM can use a variety of other approaches such
as: concurrency, pre-planned product improvements, second
sourcing, design-to-cost, evolutionary acquisition, or any
other approach that best meets the needs of the program.
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Whatever approach a PM decides to use it must be evolutionary
and updated periodically.
It is important to note that the NDI approach usually
calls for the use of a tailored version of the standard DoD
acquisition process. This point is critical and will be
discussed in more detail when the Avenger program's NDI
acquisition strategy and its execution are examined in Chapter
IV.
D. DEFINITION OF NONDEVELOPMENTAL ITEM
There are many sources that provide definitions of NDI.
While all these definitions are worded differently, they are
all generally the same. The definitions that are most
relevant to the Avenger Program are DoD and Army definitions.
DoD defines NDI in DoDI 5000.2 as:
1. Any item available in the commercial marketplace.
2. Any previously developed item in use by a Federal,
State, or local agency of the U.S. or a foreign
government with which the U.S. has a mutual defense
cooperation agreement.
3. Any item described in subparagraph 1 or 2, above,
that requires only minor modifications to meet the
requirements of the procuring agency.
4. Any item currently being produced that does not meet
the requirements of subparagraph 1, 2, or 3, above,
solely because the item is not yet in use or is not
yet available in the commercial marketplace.
[Ref.6:p. 6-L-l]
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The Army further defines NDI by using three general
categories:
1. Category A - off-the-self items (commercial,
foreign, other service) to be used in the same
environment for which the items were designed.
Research and Development (R&D) funds are not
required to develop or modify hardware or
operational software.
2. Category B - off-the-self items (commercial,
foreign, other service) to be used in an environment
different than that for which the items were
designed. The item may require modification to
hardware or operational software.
3. There is a third level of NDI effort. This approach
emphasizes integration of existing componentry and
the essential engineering effort to accomplish
systems integration. The strategy requires a
dedicated R&D configuration, to develop or modify
software, and to ensure that the total system meets
requirements. [Ref. 7: p. 17.2]
There are many examples of the above NDI acquisitions. A
good example of an Army Category A NDI is the Beretta nine
millimeter pistol [Ref. 7:p. 17.2]. An example of an Army
Category B NDI is the Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle (CUCV)
[Ref. 7:p. 17-1]. The Avenger system is an example of the
Army's third category of NDI.
The definitions of NDI clearly allow the term NDI to
describe a wide range of items. The term off-the-self item is
frequently used synonymously with NDI, but the two terms are
not the same. Off-the-self items are only one category that
DoD considers an NDI. [Ref. 8:p. 1.3]
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E. HISTORY OF NONDEVELOPMENTAL ITEMS
The use of NDI acquisition is not a new idea for DoD, but
it is new for acquisition of major weapon systems. The
emphasis on usinq NDIs beqan in 1972 when the Commission on
Government Procurement recommended that the Federal Government
shift toward a more commercial acquisition policy. This
recommendation became policy in 1976 when the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy stated that the Government's policy
was to " . . . use commercial distribution channels in
supplyinq commercial products to its users." [Ref. 9:p. 4]
Durinq the late 1970s DoD tried to implement the commercial
procurement policy by establishinq several proqrams includinq
the Commercial Commodity Proqram, the Commercial Commodity
Acquisition Proqram and the Commercial Item Support Proqram.
DoD also issued DoD Directive 5000.37 on the acquisition and
distribution of commercial products [Ref. 9:p. 5]. However,
DoD was slow to beqin usinq NDIs until the late 1980s.
The year 1986 was a turninq point for NDI acquisition.
President Ronald Reaqan established the Blue Ribbon Commission
on Defense Manaqement (the Packard Commission) and this
Commission made the followinq recommendation:
Rather than relyinq on excessively riqid military
specifications, DoD should make much qreater use of
components, systems, and services available x off the
self.' It should develop new or custom-made items only
when it has been established that those readily available
are clearly inadequate to meet military requirements.
[Ref. 10:p. xxv]
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This recommendation was taken seriously by the U.S.
Congress and it passed the NDI Preference Act as part of the
1987 Defense Authorization Act. This act required DoD to
define requirements so that acquisition managers could acquire
NDIs to fulfill them. The act also required DoD give
preference to NDIs in defense acquisitions. [Ref. 8:p. 1-2]
To ensure all DoD components were making full use of NDIs
the 1991 versions of DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoDI 5000.2 both
included guidance on NDIs. DoD Directive 5000.1 states that
"
. . . maximum practicable use shall be made of commercial
and other nondevelopmental items." [Ref. ll:p. 1.4] In
addition, DoDI 5000.2 directs "... materiel requirements
shall be satisfied to the maximum practicable extent through
the use of nondevelopmental items when such products will meet
the user's needs and are cost-effective over the entire life
cycle." [Ref. 6:p. 6-L-2]
Even with this increased emphasis on the use of NDIs,
there continues to be calls for more use of NDIs within DoD.
In January 1993 DoD Advisory Panel on Streamling and Codifying
Acquisition Law reviewed over 600 DoD-related procurement laws
and recommended to Congress that stronger policy language
favoring the use of commercial and nondevelopmental items be
incorporated into future statutes [Ref. 12:p. 10]. Most
recently, Vice President Al Gore's National Performance Review
of the Federal Government recommended the increased use of
commercial goods within DoD. The review, titled From Red Tape
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to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs
Less , proposed "... that the Pentagon make greater use of
commercial products and abandon military specifications as
much as possible." [Ref. 13:p. 3] Senior Army leadership
also stressed the use of NDIs. The Army Chief of Staff,
General Gordon R. Sullivan, stated that the Army is " . . .
moving toward maximum use of commercial specifications and
standards for weapons systems and upgrades and is taking
advantage wherever possible of commercial items to meet
military requirements (a non-developmental approach)."
[Ref. 14:p. 11]
The many internal and external influences will cause some
DoD acquisition managers to increase their use of NDIs in the
future.
F. BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF NONOEVELOPMENTAL ITEMS
1. Benefits of Nondevelopmental Items
There are numerous benefits of using an NDI
acquisition strategy described in DoD documents. A partial
list presented here are the broad, general ones that will vary
from program to program.
One of the greatest benefits is the reduced time of
the acquisition process. Many phases of the acquisition
process can be eliminated or reduced in time.
Another benefit is reduced cost. Cost reductions
occur by eliminating or reducing R&D and testing.
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The ability to use state-of-the-art technology more
easily is another benefit. By using an NDI, DoD can usually
take advantage of the commercial marketplace's current
technology.
Another benefit is the reduction in technical, cost,
and schedule risks [Ref. 8:p. 1-5]. By allowing the
commercial marketplace to research, develop and test new
items, DoD can minimize the risks involved in acquiring new
items. However, acquisition managers must balance the amount
of risk the Government accepts and the amount of risk that
Government contractors are expected to accept.
The use of NDIs also broadens and maintains the
production base by increasing the number of defense
contractors [Ref. 15:p. 10]. This benefit is important
because as DoD becomes smaller, maintaining the industrial and
mobilization base will be critical.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) asserts that an
NDI acquisition simplifies contracting procedures and allows
for the increased use of fixed-price type contracts
[Ref. 16:p. 11]. Contract administration and management of
fixed-price type contracts is easier and less costly than the
administration of cost-reimbursement type contracts used for
R&D efforts.
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2. Challenges of Nondevelopmental Items
An NDI acquisition strategy presents several
challenges. Acquisition managers will weigh these challenges
against benefits when developing their acquisition strategy.
Straight forward use of NDIs may result in reductions
of system performance parameters. Some trade-off analysis may
be required to ensure all major user requirements are met.
One of the most widely documented challenges of using
an NDI is the difficulty of logistical support for the NDI.
The shortened acquisition process of an NDI acquisition does
not allow time for a complete Logistic Support Analysis (LSA)
to be conducted before the system is to be fielded. There
have been numerous problems with logistical support aspects of
past DoD NDI programs. Logistical planning that accounts for
NDIs must begin early in the acquisition cycle.
The use of NDIs may require acceptance of some minor
safety deficiencies that a full-scale development program
would not accept [Ref. 7:p. 17.3].
The use of NDIs may cause problems with integrated
logistics support, training and configuration management [Ref.
7:p. 17.3]. With a large number of NDIs within DoD,
standardization and implementation of the above operations
could be difficult. Also challenging is the integration and
interface of related weapon systems.
An additional challenge of an NDI acquisition is that
the standard internal support processes must be expedited or
17
tailored to accommodate an NDI [Ref. 17:p. 384]. These
processes of developing organization and equipment
authorizations are complex and DoD has not designed them for
NDIs. For the Army these processes include such items as
Basis of Issue Planning (BOIP) and the Table of Organization
and Equipment (TOE) authorization process [Ref. 7:p. 17.3].
To ensure an NDI acquisition fielding is conducted
effectively, acquisition managers must know these processes
and modify them accordingly.
An NDI acquisition may restrict important Government
Research and Development (R&D) efforts [Ref. 18:p. 8].
A robust R&D effort in key areas of science and engineering is
critical to the development of technologically superior weapon
systems.
18
III. THE AVENGER PROGRAM
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE AVENGER
The Avenger is the Line-of-Sight Rear (LOS-R) component of
the Army's five part Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) system.
It is a lightweight, mobile Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) and
gun system mounted on an M998 1 1/4 ton High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). 1 The Avenger carries
four Stinger SAMs in each of two Standard Vehicle Mounted
Launchers (SVML) mounted on either side of a 360 degree
traversing turret that make up the missile subsystem of the
Avenger's fire unit. The Avenger also has one .50-caliber M3P
machine gun and an ammunition system mounted on the right side
of the turret under the SVML that make up the gun subsystem of
the Avenger's fire unit.
A crew of two (gunner and driver) operates these weapons
through an integrated target acquisition, fire control and
communication system. The gunner performs target acquisition
by using a Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensor that is
mounted under the left SVML. A laser range finder is also
Currently, production Avengers are being mounted on the
M1097A1 HMMWV Heavy Variant (HHV) as prescribed in the Avenger
System Improvement Plan. The HHV provides an increased payload
capacity to accommodate Pre-Planned Product Improvements (P 3 I). The
first production Avengers that were initially mounted on the M998
HMMWV will be retrofitted with the HHV as funds are available.
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mounted adjacent to the FLIR to provide range data to the fire
control computer. These components give the fire unit the
capability to engage targets during both bad weather and at
night. An AN/PPX-3 Identification Friend-or-Foe (IFF) sensor
provides positive identification of friendly aircraft. The
gunner controls all these components from an enclosed canopied
compartment between the SVMLs, using a set of turret hand
controls for manual tracking. The gunner can also set the
system to automatic by using the Automatic Video Tracker (AVT)
that is slaved to the FLIR. The AVT controls turret rotation
and SVML movement until the engagement is complete or the
gunner turns the AVT off. All these devices enable the
Avenger to engage targets while either the HMMWV is moving or
stationary.
The Avenger Control Electronics (ACE) is the main computer
for the entire system. It continually monitors system
functions and allows for function testing by the crewmen. The
crew can also perform all the target acquisition and fire
control actions by using the Remote Control Unit (RCU). This
unit is stored in the cab of the HMMWV and the crew can carry
it to any location within 50 meters of the system.
The Avenger is equipped with radio, intercom and
Communication Security (COMSEC) subsystems. The radio
subsystem consists of a Single-Channel Ground and Airborne
Radio System (SINCGARS) or an AN/VRC-47 series radio which
provides secure communications. The intercom consists of an
20
AN/VIC-1 set that allows the gunner and driver to communicate
with each other. New FAAD Command, Control and Intelligence
(C 2I) equipment will be incorporated into the Avenger as Pre-
planned Product Improvements (P3 I) are fielded.
The Avenger will operate within the family of FAAD systems
with a mission of countering both high-speed fixed and rotary-
wing aircraft. The primary targets will be aircraft attacking
stationary and mobile critical assets in brigade, division and
corps rear areas. The Avenger is used in all types of terrain
and weather and will normally not be deployed farther forward
than the battalion rear boundary. To perform its mission the
Avenger is assigned to the FAAD battalions of heavy, light,
special divisions, as well as armored cavalry regiments and
corps air defense brigades. Figure 2 illustrates the major
components of the Avenger System and Appendix B furnishes a
more detailed description of Avenger specifications.
B. ACQUISITION HISTORY OF THE AVENGER
The development of the Avenger began in the early 1980s as
an unsolicited private venture project by the Defense Systems
Division of the Boeing Aerospace Company 2 [Ref. 19]. At
that time Boeing was under contract to produce the Roland Air
Defense System for the U.S. Army. During company testing of
2The Defense Systems Division of Boeing Aerospace is now known
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the Roland, Boeing conducted several successful test firings
of Stinger missiles from Roland launchers using Roland's
acquisition and track radars to point the Stingers
[Ref. 20:p. 29]. These successful firings convinced Boeing
that they could integrate Stinger launchers into an air
defense system that they could mount on the Army's newly
developed HMMWV.
Boeing began development of the Avenger in 1983 and by May
1984 the first prototype was ready for testing. With the help
of the 9th Infantry Division's (Motorized) Division Air
Defense Artillery (DIVADA), Boeing carried out test firings at
the Yakima Washington Firing Center. Crewmen fired three
missiles at aerial targets, two from a moving HMMWV and one
from a stationary HMMWV. One of the moving shots was a direct
hit and evaluators scored the other as a tactical kill. The
stationary firing was also a direct hit. These test firings
were the first demonstrations of shoot-on-the-move SAM firings
for the Army.
While Boeing was developing and testing the Avenger, the
U.S. Army's Missile Command (MICOM) was working with General
Dynamics Corporation to develop a Stinger missile system
similar to the Avenger called the Setter. The Army called
these types of Stinger Missile Systems Pedestal-Mounted
Stingers (PMS). In the Summer of 1985 the Army Air Defense
Artillery Board and Army Development and Employment Agency
(ADEA) tested both the Setter and Avenger systems. The 9th
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Infantry Division's (Motorized) DIVADA conducted these tests
at the Yakima Washington Firing Center. These tests ". . .
indicated that the technology was advanced enough to
warrant an NDI acquisition strategy." [Ref. 21] Based on
these test results, in August 1985 the Army Vice Chief of
Staff, General Max Thurman, directed the Army to buy a PMS
.
Another event in August 1985 had a significant impact on
the acquisition of PMS systems for the Army. Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger terminated the Sergeant York Air
Defense Gun system which was to have been the mainstay of
divisional air defense units. This program termination forced
the Army to reexamine the way it provided air defense for its
divisions. To conduct this reexamination the Army formed the
Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) Working Group at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. The working group's mission was "...
to develop a comprehensive and fully integrated counterair
approach to the forward area air defense problem."
[Ref. 22:p. 12]
The FAAD Working Group, which convened from August 1985 to
January 1986, concluded that the Soviet Union was rapidly
expanding and upgrading its aerial weapon systems and that no
one air defense system could counter all air threats to the
Army's divisions. The working group's solution to counter the
increasing air threat was to create the Forward Area Air
Defense System (FAAD) system. This FAAD system was a system
of five components. The FAAD Working Group developed the FAAD
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system so that the components would work together to counter
all types of air threats to the division. The five components
of the FAAD system were: Command , Control and Intelligence
(C 2I); Line-of-Sight Rear (LOS-R); Non-Line of Sight (NLOS);
Line-of-Sight Forward (LOS-F); and the Combined Arms
Initiative (CAI).
The FAAD Working Group and Army Air Defense Artillery
(ADA) leadership realized that they would have to field the
FAAD system quickly because of the rapidly increasing air
threat to Army divisions and the limited ability of the
current divisional air defense systems to deal with this
threat. They also understood that besides acquiring the FAAD
components quickly, they would have to acquire them at the
lowest possible costs. Because off-the-self equipment and
technology were available to meet most requirements of the
FAAD components, and because of the urgent need for the
system, senior Army leaders directed that an NDI approach be
used whenever possible to acquire FAAD components [Ref . 22 :p.
14]. With this guidance, and because of the prior market
investigation conducted on the Avenger and Setter systems, the
FAAD Working Group recommended that a PMS system be used as
the LOS-R component of the FAAD system. This recommendation,
along with the rest of the FAAD system concept, was then
presented to the Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in
January 1986. He approved both the recommendation and the
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FAAD system concept. This led to the FAAD system becoming one
of the Army's top acquisition requirements, second only to the
requirement for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle [Ref. 5:p. 1].
With the FAAD system approved, Army acquisition managers
began the acquisition process for the FAAD components. In
March 1986 the DAB approved the FAAD system Required
Operational Capability (ROC) document. 3 Since the LOS-R
component was going to be an NDI PMS system, DoD considered
this approval a Milestone IIIA review decision, Low Rate
Initial Production (LRIP), and the Army began planning for an
NDI Candidate Evaluation (NDICE) for PMS.
In July 1986 the Army issued a Request For Proposal (RFP)
for a PMS system. Three companies submitted proposals and a
$100,000 test support contract was given to each to supply a
single prototype PMS for testing during the NDICE. The three
companies were Boeing Aerospace with the Avenger, General
Dynamics/Thomson-CSF/Hughes Electro-Optical Data Systems Group
with an unnamed prototype and LTV Aerospace with the
Crossbow, formerly called the Setter. [Ref. 23:p. 151]
In November 1986 the Army began the NDICE that was
conducted in two phases at Fort Bliss, Texas and White Sands
Missile Range, New Mexico. The Army soon excused the General
Dynamics Systems Group candidate from the competition when the
3The Required Operational Capability document is now known as
the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) which was discussed in
Chapter II.
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candidate could not meet the weight requirements [Ref. 20: p.
30]. The Army then continued tests between the Avenger and
Crossbow until July 1987.
Based on the results of the NDICE, Boeing's Avenger was
selected to fulfill the requirement for a PMS to be the LOS-R
component of the FAAD system. In August 1987 the Army awarded
Boeing an engineering development contract with production
options to produce the Avenger for the Army. This was a $16.2
million contract for the first option buy of 20 Avengers [Ref.
23 :p. 151]. The contract also contained production options
for FY 1987 through FY 1991 for a total procurement of 273
Avengers [Ref. 24:p. 1], Also in 1987 the Army categorized
the Avenger as Type-Classified Limited Procurement Urgent (TC-
LPU) because of its critical need. The TC-LPU designation met
the operational requirements for the Avenger were urgent
because no system in the Army's inventory at that time could
satisfy them [Ref. 7:p. 17.12]. Fourteen months after
awarding the Avenger contract to Boeing in November 1988, the
Army received the first two production models of the Avenger.
During the time until the first production Avengers were
received, the Army began the first phase of Force Development
Test and Evaluation (FDT&E) with the NDICE Avenger prototype
to establish a baseline for tactics, doctrine and training
issues. The Army conducted this test in June and July 1988 at
Fort Bliss, Texas. Once production model Avengers were
received, six were used to conduct the second phase of FDT&E
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at Fort Hunter Liggett, California in February and March 1989.
This phase was used to test and validate the concepts
established in the first phase of FDT&E.
While the Army was conducting these tests, Boeing
continued to deliver Avengers and by April 1989 the Army
equipped its first tactical unit with Avengers. 4 During the
next two years the Army continued to exercise the production
options of the Avenger contract and Boeing continued to
deliver Avengers. Initial Operational Capability (IOC), which
was the first attainment of the minimum capability to
effectively employ the Avenger, was reached in January 1991
during the deployment of Avengers in support of Operation
Desert Storm.
The Army conducted two additional tests in 1989. These
tests were the Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E)
and the Production Qualification Test (PQT). These tests
cleared the way for the Avenger to be Type-Classified Standard
(TC-S), which meant the Avenger was categorized as a standard
system within the Army's inventory. It also cleared the way
for a full-scale production Milestone IIIB review. At the
Milestone IIIB review in April 1990, the DAB approved full-
scale production of the Avenger and returned control/oversight
of the program to the Department of Army. Once the original
contract expired, the Army awarded a $436.2 million five-year
4This unit was the ADA platoon of 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment
(ACR) stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas.
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multiyear (FY 1991 through FY 1995) production contract to
Boeing in February 1992 for the production of 6 79 Avengers
This number included 600 for the Army and 79 for the U.S.
Marine Corps. The Army has fielded Avengers to the units as
shown in Table 1 with the systems it has received so far.
TABLE 1 - AVENGER FIELDINGS
Unit
3rd ACR (III CORPS)
4-5 ADA (1st CAV DIV)
5-5 ADA (2nd ID)
1-5 ADA (24th MX)
1-2 ADA (108th ADA BDE
)
2-62 ADA (7th LID)
2-44 ADA (101st ABN DIV)
2-2 ADA (35th ADA BDE)
Fielding Dates
April 1989
August - November 1990
September - November 1991
January - March 1992
June 1992 - October 1992
November 1992 - March 1993
May - July 1993
August - October 1993
Currently, Boeing is producing Avengers in the fourth year
of the multiyear production contract. The Army is continuing
to field Avengers to its units through the use of a New
Eguipment Training (NET) Program. Avenger acquisition
managers are also continuing to improve the Avengers through
the use of P3 I block upgrades. Appendix C provides a
consolidated chronological list of the major events of the
Avenger Program.
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C. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OF THE AVENGER
In 1986 the Army placed the control of the PMS Program5
under the control of the Stinger Project Office at the U.S.
Army's Missile Command (MICOM), Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.
Army acquisition executives placed the PMS Program under the
control of the Stinger Project Office because at the time the
Stinger PM was responsible for managing all weapon systems
that were using Stinger missiles, including the man-portable
air defense system (MANPADS) Stinger and the Air-to-Air
Stinger. The Stinger Project Office had all the personnel and
resources to support the Avenger Program. [Ref. 25]
The Stinger PM and the Avenger staff had the overall
responsibility for the accomplishment of the Avenger Program
objectives and were charged with acquiring and fielding a
cost-effective Avenger system. To help meet these
responsibilities, the Stinger PM had the support of the
Avenger staff, the Stinger Project Office and MICOM. In
fulfilling his responsibilities the Stinger PM interfaced with
the many organizations involved with the Avenger Program.
Some of the major organizations included the combat developer,
test and evaluation agencies and cost analysis agencies. The
PM was also the principal Government representative to the
Avenger contractor.
5The PMS Program was later renamed the Avenger Program after
the Avenger was selected to fulfill the LOS-R requirement.
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As the Avenger Program proceeded through the acquisition
process and grew in size, Army acquisition executives made the
Avenger Program a separate program with a separate Avenger PM
reporting directly to the Program Executive Office-Air Defense
(PEO-AD). This elevated the status of the Avenger Program and
made it more visible. The Avenger Program remained a separate
program until 1993 when it was consolidated with other FAAD
Programs under the control of the FAAD Project Office.
Currently, the Avenger Program remains under the control of
the FAAD Project Office at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.
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IV. THE AVENGER PROGRAM'S ACQUISITION STRATEGY
A. INTRODUCTION
As discussed in Chapter II the acquisition strategy is the
basic approach for managing a program throughout the
acquisition process. The acquisition strategy serves as the
foundation for the development of other program functional
plans such as the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) and
the Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP). An Acquisition
Plan (AP) is also developed that describes how the acquisition
strategy will be implemented through the use of contractual
instruments.
The initial acquisition strategy for the Avenger Program
was developed in September 1986 and approved by the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and
Acquisition. Because the Avenger Program was moving rapidly
through the acquisition process, this acquisition strategy and
many other program documents were prepared quickly and then
revised later in the program [Ref. 26]. The Avenger
acquisition strategy was updated in May 1988 to reflect
changes in the program and this version is the one that will
be examined because it was the one that primarily guided the
program.
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B. AVENGER ACQUISITION STRATEGY
The Avenger acquisition strategy was prepared in the
format required by Army Regulation 70-1. It identified 12
major elements that were critical to the overall management of
the program. Each of these elements will be described below:
1 . Program Structure
The program structure for the Avenger Program called
for a prime contractor with total system integration
responsibility. The Army implemented this program structure
by using a competitive NDI procurement. This program
structure was selected because the market investigations
indicated that a PMS system could be produced primarily by
integrating available militarized or commercial
subsystems, with a minimum amount of modification.
[Ref. 27:p. 1]
2 . Contracting Strategy
The Avenger acquisition strategy called for a
contracting strategy that made the maximum possible use of
competition throughout the acquisition process. This strategy
was adopted because of the results of the market
investigations and the Army's earlier evaluations of the
Avenger and Setter systems. The Avenger acquisition strategy
defined this competition strategy in a Total Life Cycle
Competition Strategy (TLCCS). This TLCCS incorporated the
following elements:
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1. Broad-based, full and open competition in the
procurement and sustainment phases.
2. Full and open competitive selection of the initial
contractor.
3. Multiyear follow-on acquisitions of the system.
4. Competitive, dual source procurement of the SVML.
5. Use of contract options to enhance competitive
reprocurements
.
6. Spare Acquisition Integrated with Production (SAIP)
with flexibility to competitively break-out spares
procurement
.
7. Competition by the prime contractor in sub-
contracting.
8. No Government funding for contractor facilitization
or tooling. [Ref. 27:p. 1]
The contracting strategy also called for the use of
firm-fixed-price (FFP) contracts to the maximum extent
possible throughout the program because of the anticipated low
risk involved with the program. Additionally, the strategy
stated that the initial contract would be an FFP contract that
would include the following major options:
1. Delivery of the first system 14 months after
contract award.
2. Provisions for Interim Contractor Support (ICS) and
SAIP until the Army could implement its logistics
support structure.
3. Planned annual procurement quantities for four
additional years.
4. Delivery of a Technical Data Package (TDP) with
rights delineated in a license agreement. [Ref.
27:p. 2]
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In addition, the contracting strategy called for the
contractor to provide a 36-month warranty at no cost to the
Government. The warranty would require the contractor to
repair or reimburse the Government for all defective
components returned to the factory. Defective components were
defined as both individual item failures and systemic defects.
3. Tailoring the Acquisition Process
In this section of the acquisition strategy there was
an explanation of how the acquisition process would be
tailored for the Avenger Program. The strategy stated that
because of the market investigations and because of industry
responses to the RFP, there was little risk in the immediate
acquisition of the PMS as an NDI . To implement the NDI
strategy, program management officials were allowed to tailor
the acquisition process so that the Avenger could move
directly into the P/D phase. The strategy stated, "There was
no need for either an advanced development (AD) or full scale
development (FSD) program to precede procurement." [Ref. 27:p.
14] The strategy called for approval to move directly into
the P/D phase to be made at the Milestone IIIA review that was
also the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) decision review.
The strategy also called for other areas of the
acquisition process to be tailored. During the P/D phase, the
strategy called for concurrent design of P3 I requirements to
further compress the acquisition process and to accelerate the
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deployment of improvements. During contracting for the
Avenger the strategy stated that the use of specifications,
standards, test plans and contract data requirements should be
minimized to eliminate no-cost effective contractual
requirements. The strategy also directed that requirements
not mandated by law or established by DoD or Army policy and
that do not contribute to the operational effectiveness,
effective management, or support of the Avenger be excluded
from the program. Finally, the strategy allowed the
contractor maximum freedom to use contractor format for
reports, plans, training manuals and maintenance manuals.
4. Manpower Personnel Integration
Manpower Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) was an
important part of the Avenger strategy even though it was an
NDI strategy. Because the tailored acquisition process of the
Avenger Program precluded the early analysis of the man and
machine interface, the acquisition strategy had to define how
these analyses would be conducted later in the acquisition
process. The strategy directed that MANPRINT analyses begin
with the assurance that the initial RFP would require each
bidder to address the implications of their design for
manpower, personnel, training, health hazards and safety.
The strategy also directed that MANPRINT considerations
continue to be evaluated during all tests of the Avenger
Program from NDICE through PQT. Finally, the strategy stated
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that MANPRINT considerations would be built into all P3 I
development tasks.
5. Supportability
To ensure there would be proper logistical support for
the first Avengers fielded the acguisition strategy called for
the contractor to provide Interim Contractor Support (ICS) for
at least the first 29 months of fielding. The acquisition
strategy also directed that supply support be accomplished
through the procurement of Mandatory Parts List (MPL) and
Authorized Stockage List (ASL) items as recommended by the
contractor and approved by MICOM. The acquisition strategy
called for the stockage of both MPL and ASL items at ICS
centers and for the ICS centers to provide parts on a direct
exchange basis to Avenger units as needed.
Although the Avenger was an NDI acquisition, the
acquisition strategy established supportability goals for the
system. The strategy called for the maximum use of built-in-
test equipment; line replaceable units; standard support
equipment; and test, measurement and diagnostic equipment.
The use of these items was important because the strategy
called for the Avenger to be incorporated into the standard
Army logistics support system when ICS was complete. A
detailed plan of how the Avenger was to be supported was




6. Manufacturing and Production
The manufacturing and production section of the
acquisition strategy directed that the contractor have total
system integration responsibility for the Avenger. This
involved the prime contractor assembling components and
subsystems provided by subcontractors and the Government into
a complete system. The strategy called for three key
subsystems to be provided to the contractor as Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE). These three GFE subsystems were
the SVML, the Electronic Component Assembly (ECA) and the
HMMWV. All other components and subsystems not provided by
the Government were to be procured from approved
subcontractors
.
The manufacturing and production section called for
the total production of 1,207 Avenger systems through FY 1999.
This total was later changed to 1,779 and then to 1,001. All
of these production quantities included systems produced under
the initial contract options and the five-year multiyear
contract planned for FY 1991 through FY 1995. The details of
how manufacturing and production were to be completed were
described in the Production Readiness Master Plan (PRMP) for
Avenger.
7. Test and Evaluation
The test and evaluation section of the acquisition
strategy called for a test and evaluation program tailored to
support the NDI acquisition strategy and to ensure essential
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operational and technical tests were performed on the Avenger.
To meet this objective the strategy listed four types of tests
that would be conducted on the Avenger. These tests were NDI
Candidate Evaluation (NDICE), Force Development Test and
Experimentation (FDT&E), Production Qualification Test (PQT)
and Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). The test
and evaluation section described these tests in the following
manner.
The NDICE would be a combined technical and
operational evaluation of the proposed candidate systems using
representative soldiers. The primary objective of this
evaluation was to collect sufficient technical and operational
data to assess the capability of each candidate system to
satisfy the PMS requirements.
The FDT&E would be conducted in two phases to
define/refine tactics, techniques, procedures and
organizations. Phase I would be conducted in modules to allow
experimentation with an established baseline to simplify the
development of tactics, deployment, training, organization and
operator Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) at
the squad level. Phase II would be conducted by the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to test/validate
training, tactics, techniques, procedures, doctrine,
logistics, organizational concepts and organizational
maintenance training at the platoon level.
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The PQT would be used to validate Avenger
specification compliance and to obtain data to type classify
the M3P .50-caliber machine gun. It would also provide data
to support a safety release and the type classification of the
system as standard equipment. The test would include
environmental testing; acquisition and tracking; missile
firings; and transportability testing.
The IOT&E would test the operational suitability and
overall effectiveness of the Avenger system. The test would
follow the approved TRADOC operational mode summary/mission
profile for system reliability evaluation and include a
maneuver phase and a missile firings phase.
The test and evaluation section also stated that the
U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) would be
responsible for planning, conducting and reporting on Avenger
technical testing. It also stated that the U.S. Army
Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA) would be
responsible for overseeing operational testing. In addition,
it said that the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency (AMSAA)
would be the independent evaluator for technical tests and for
the preparation of the Independent Evaluation Plan (IEP).
Details of the test and evaluation of the Avenger were




8. Cost Growth and Drivers
As with any acquisition program the cost of the
Avenger was a critical issue. The Avenger acquisition
strategy addressed cost by stating, "Because of the NDI
Acquisition Strategy, many of the normal cost goals are not
appropriate to the PMS . " [Ref: 27: p. 5] The only cost goal to
be used in the Avenger Program would be the Program
Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC). The PAUC included the
procurement costs plus RDT&E costs. The strategy also said
that design-to-cost would not be used because the system was
available for immediate production as an NDI.
9. Technical Risk
The acquisition strategy assessed the technical risk
of the program to be low because the Avenger was an NDI and
because of the previous test and evaluation of the Avenger and
the Setter systems. It said the primary technical risks would
be in achieving the required Reliability, Availability and
Maintainability (RAM) characteristics and operational
readiness. To ensure these risks were reduced, the strategy
called for a test and evaluation program that included
elements to identify technical problems that would then be
corrected.
10. Human Factors Engineering, Safety and Health
Human Factors Engineering (HFE), safety and health
issues were important in the Avenger Program as they were in
any acquisition program. The Avenger acquisition strategy
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stated that HFE analyses and safety/health assessments would
be conducted throughout the testing of the system to identify
any issues affecting soldier and system effectiveness. The
strategy also said that a system safety and health hazard
prevention program would be implemented for the life of the
system.
11. Standardization and Interoperability
Standardization and interoperability issues present
special challenges for the Avenger program. The Avenger
acquisition strategy stated that because of the use of an NDI
no effort would be made to use standard hardware except for
the GFE provided to the contractor. It also said that the
hardware would be used "as is" with non-metric design
standards. In addressing interoperability the acquisition
strategy stated that because the Stinger missile was
interchangeable with other weapon systems interoperability
with NATO and other allies will be enhanced.
12. Survivability and Endurance
The acquisition strategy addressed survivability and
endurance by directing that several measures be taken. First,
it stated the system must have ballistic protection equal or
greater than that of the HMMWV within specified weight
constraints. Secondly, it said the system must meet the
standards of AR 70-71 for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
(NBC) survivability. Thirdly, it directed that the system
must be decontaminable using materials that resist contaminant
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absorption and must be designed to allow easy access to
exposed surfaces for decontamination. Finally, the strategy
stated that collective protection equipment, a ventilated
faceplate system, was desired within specified weight and
configuration constraints.
C. ANALYSIS OF THE AVENGER PROGRAM'S ACQUISITION STRATEGY
To determine why the Avenger Program's NDI acquisition
strategy was a success, both the factors that made the program
successful and the shortcomings that occurred during the
execution of the program will be analyzed. These factors and
shortcomings are the result of the execution of the program as
guided by its NDI acquisition strategy. From these factors
and shortcomings lessons-learned will be identified in the
next chapter, but first it must be established that the
Avenger Program was indeed a success.
The Avenger Program is considered successful because the
program achieved its primary goal of satisfying an identified,
validated mission need. The Avenger Program did field an
effective weapon system that met the Army's FAAD needs. The
program also met cost, schedule and performance objectives,
which DoD uses to measure the effectiveness of its acquisition
programs.
In meeting the Army's mission need for a LOS-R component
of the FAAD System, the Avenger has been praised by ADA
leaders and soldiers at all levels because they believe the
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Avenger met their user mission requirements. The Avenger
especially received superb reviews during the Persian Gulf War
as illustrated by the following comments from ADA soldiers.
An Avenger battalion commander during the Persian Gulf War
said of the Avenger, "The system worked great, the soldiers
loved it, leaders believed in it and it provided significant
new capabilities to the division." [Ref. l:p. 24] The same
battalion commander stated, "During Operation Desert Shield
and Desert Storm, Avenger lived up to the expectations of
soldiers who have been singing its praises since its initial
fieldings." [Ref. l:p. 24] The commanding general of the
Army's MICOM also lauded the Avenger's performance. He
declared, "Of all our systems in Southwest Asia, Avenger was
one of the standouts." [Ref. l:p. 22]
The Avenger also received favorable comments during
fieldings after the Persian Gulf War. A battalion commander
whose unit was fielding the Avenger said, "With Avenger, we
believe the Army got its money's worth." [Ref. 28:p. 37]
Also important in fielding of the Avenger was what the soldier
thought about the system. Soldiers using the Avenger
generally praised the system. Typical of their comments was
what one Avenger gunner said about the Avenger's capabilities.
He declared, "It doesn't matter where the bogey's 6 coming
5Bogey is an Army term for enemy aircraft.
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from, we'll get him." [Ref. 29] These comments illustrate
the confidence ADA leaders and soldiers had in the Avenger.
In meeting cost objectives the Avenger Program also did
well. The Avenger Program's Acguisition Program Baseline
(APB) objective cost for RDT&E, in base year (1989) dollars,
was $13.3 million with a threshold of $15.3 million. The
program met the threshold objective. The program's current
APB objective cost for procurement, in base year (1989)
dollars, is $1,638.8 million with a threshold of $1,720.7
million. This estimate was based on the procurement of 1,779
Avengers. Because of force reductions the directed total
number of Avengers to be procured has been changed to 1,001.
Based on this quantity of Avengers, the PM currently
estimates procurement costs to be $1,258.0 million.
[Ref. 30:p. 5-3-1]
Even though the average unit production cost per Avenger
will increase from $921,000 to $1,075 million because of the
decrease in the total number of Avengers procured, the program
is not expected to incur any major cost overruns.
In the area of schedule objectives the Avenger Program was
one of few DoD acquisition programs to meet its schedule
objectives. The Avenger Program's acquisition strategy called
for the first Avenger to be delivered to the Army 14 months
after the initial contract was awarded. When the initial
contract was awarded to Boeing, the first Avenger was required
to be delivered to the Army in November 1988. Boeing met this
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date and delivered the first two Avengers on November 1, 1988.
The program's schedule also called for the First Unit Equipped
(FUE) to be in 1989. Boeing delivered Avengers on schedule
and in April 1989 the Army equipped the Air Defense Artillery
(ADA) Platoon of the 3rd ACR with Avengers. Today, Boeing is
continuing to deliver Avengers on time or ahead of schedule
and the Army is fielding Avengers on schedule.
In meeting its performance objectives the Avenger system
has met or exceeded all but one of the major performance
objectives. Table 2 presents several major unclassified
performance objectives and the respective demonstrated
performances [Ref. 30:p. 5-1-1]. It can be seen, with the
exception of the machine gun range, that the Avenger system
has demonstrated or exceeded expected performance
requirements
.
From the above cost, schedule and performance data it can
be seen that the Avenger Program was a successful NDI
acquisition. Now that it has been established that the
Avenger Program was successful, the factors that made it a
success will be examined.
1. Success Factors
The Avenger Program has demonstrated that the Army can
acquire and field a major weapon system by using an NDI
acquisition strategy. The analysis of this acquisition
reveals many factors that led to the program's success. The
factors examined here are not all inclusive, but rather the
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*MTBOMF - Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failure
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ones the author feels are most significant. Each factor will
be analyzed to determine how they contributed to the overall
success of the Avenger Program.
An important factor that led to the success of the
Avenger Program was the overall high-level approval and
support that the program received. This approval and support
was critical because " . . . most successful and stable
programs will be those that have a well defined need/
requirement that is firmly supported and advocated by the user
community at all levels." [Ref. 31: p. 10-10] A program must
also " . . .be perceived at all levels, including Congress, as
being a well-managed program with a credible program manager
and staff." [Ref. 31:p. 10-11]
DoD, Army leaders, Congress and ADA users all strongly
backed the Avenger Program because it was within cost, was
usually ahead of schedule and exceeded performance
requirements [Ref. 26]. Some of the strongest approval and
support for the Avenger Program came from the ADA users.
Typical of the comments supporting the program were the
following statements from Major Generals Donald Infante, Chief
of ADA from 1985-1989 and Donald Lionetti, Chief of ADA from
1989-1991. General Infante called the Avenger highly
effective and ". . .a real success story." [Ref. 32:p. 54]
General Lionetti said the Avenger "... provides a tremendous
improvement in our ability to defend forward forces." [Ref.
29: p. 10] The Avenger Program also received support because
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it was the first component of the FAAD System to be fielded.
General Lionetti said in 1991:
The top branch modernization priority continues to be the
fielding of the FAAD systems to our light and heavy
divisions. It enjoys solid backing from the Secretary of
Defense on down through the Army leadership. [Ref. 29:p.
15]
The Avenger Program also received approval and support
from Congress as evidenced by Congress' continued funding of
the program. The Avenger program has received stable funding
from the beginning of the program and Congress has approved
the use of multiyear production funding. This stable funding
has allowed the Avenger program to implement its acquisition
strategy in a timely manner.
The Avenger Program received this high-level approval
and support because program management officials developed a
comprehensive NDI acquisition strategy and then implemented it
in an effective manner. The Avenger Program also received the
support of the users because the Avenger was an effective
weapon system that performed well and was fielded in a timely
manner.
The next factor that made the Avenger Program
successful was the effective market investigation that was
conducted by the Army. The market investigation is a crucial
factor in making an NDI acquisition work well. In the case of
the Avenger Program, the Army investigated several different
systems to determine if a PMS concept was feasible. From
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these market investigations senior acquisition officials and
the users determined that the PMS concept was feasible and
that an NDI acquisition strategy was appropriate. Without
making this thorough market investigation successful
implementation of the Avenger acquisition strategy would have
been difficult if not impossible.
As explained in Chapter II logistical support of an
NDI is one of the most difficult challenges that acquisition
managers face when trying to manage an NDI acquisition
program. Program management officials realized that total
logistical support would not be available when the system was
first deployed because of the speed of which the Avenger
system was to be fielded. To meet this challenge program
management officials developed and implemented a successful
acquisition strategy that ensured that the Avenger would be
fielded with adequate logistical support. This strategy was
successful primarily because of the use of ICS during the
first 29 months of fielding. The use of ICS allowed the
program officials time to establish the logistical structure
needed for the Army to support the Avenger with its own
resources.
An additional factor that led to the Avenger Program's
success was the effective use of FFP contracts for most of the
program's contracts. The use of a multiyear production
contract was also important. Because the Avenger was an NDI
with little R&D involved and because there was little risk
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involved in the program, program management officials were
able to take advantage of the benefits of using fixed-price
type contracts. These benefits included reduced contract
administration and management costs and reduced contractual
risk. Also, because of the stability of the program a
multiyear production contract was appropriate. This allowed
the Government to take advantage of lower Economic Order
Quality (EOQ) prices offered by the contractor. The
contractor was able to offer these lower EOQ prices because
there was a guarantee that the Army would buy Avengers for
five years rather than just one year.
Another factor that helped make the Avenger Program a
success was the program's effective tailoring of the
acquisition process. As pointed out earlier, the tailoring of
the acquisition process is critical when using an NDI
acquisition strategy. Program management officials were given
great latitude in tailoring the acquisition process because of
the urgent need for the Avenger, because the Avenger was an
NDI, and because of the expected low technical risk in
producing the Avenger. The tailored acquisition process
allowed much of the administrative and procedural requirements
to be eliminated or modified. This allowed both time and
costs to be reduced.
One more factor that contributed to the success of the
Avenger Program was the tailored approach that called for the
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concurrent design of P 3Is during the P/D phase of the
acquisition process. Since the need for the Avenger was
urgent, the Army decided to procure the Avenger from Boeing
with only two major changes. The two changes were the
addition of a Predicted Fire Weapon (PFW) 7 and an RCU [Ref.
26]. All other improvements were scheduled to be made later as
outlined in the Avenger System Improvement Plan (SIP). The
advantage of using this approach was that it allowed the Army
to field the Avenger quickly and yet make materiel changes to
improve the performance of the system later.
Another factor that contributed to the success of the
Avenger Program was the tailored test and evaluation (T&E)
program, especially the NDICE. Again, because the Avenger was
an NDI the Army was allowed to modify the T&E of the Avenger.
This tailoring of T&E allowed the Army to reduce overall
testing and to combine developmental testing and operational
testing. This tailored T&E of the Avenger allowed the Army to
field the system quicker and to save T&E funds.
One last factor that contributed to the success of the
Avenger Program was the dedication and experience of the prime
contract, Boeing Aerospace. Army acquisition managers made a
wise choice in the selection of Boeing as the prime contractor
for the Avenger. Boeing had experience with several air
7The Predicted Fire Weapon (PFW) that Boeing used to fulfill
this requirement was the M3P .50-caliber machine gun.
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defense systems, as well as experience with the Avenger. This
indicated that Boeing could produce the Avenger on time and
within cost. This indication proved to be true and Boeing has
constantly delivered Avengers on time and within cost.
2 . Shortcomings
Although the Avenger Program was an overall success,
the program still had several shortcomings. It is important
to analyze these shortcomings, as well as the successes, to
learn from past difficulties. Again, these shortcomings are
not all inclusive, but the ones the author feels are
significant. Each shortcoming will be analyzed to determine
what happened and what effect the shortcomings had on the
program.
When Army acquisition managers decided to procure the
Avenger they directed Boeing to make two major changes to the
system. These changes were the addition of a PFW and an RCU.
Boeing was able to easily add an RCU to the Avenger, but the
addition of the PFW proved to be more difficult.
The original performance requirement called for a PFW
with a range of four kilometers. To meet this requirement
Boeing decided to use a nonstandard M3P .50-caliber machine
gun made by Fabrique National Herstal. The machine gun was an
old refurbished Army M2 machine gun that was modified for use
on the Avenger. Army acquisition managers approved the use of
the M3P, but because the machine gun was of an old design and
because of production quality control problems, it did not
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meet the range requirement and experienced reliability
difficulties. [Ref. 25]
Although there were problems with the M3P the Avenger
passed PQT in 1989 and full production approval for the
Avenger was given. However, because of the problems with the
machine gun the Avenger was fielded without the M3P. There
was also difficulty obtaining assistance to correct the
machine gun problems. The U.S. Army's Armament, Munitions and
Chemical Command (AMCCOM), which is the Army's proponent for
all machine guns, had difficulties helping because the M3P was
not developed by them. Many regulations and policies also
prevented AMCCOM from assisting because the M3P was a
nonstandard weapon. This unavailability of assistance
resulted in little being accomplished from 1990 to 1992 to
correct the problems and therefore no M3Ps were fielded during
that time.
In 1992 the Avenger PM began pressuring Boeing to
correct the M3P problems. To begin correcting the problems
MICOM began assisting and two tests were conducted on the M3P
at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama with the help of Boeing. These
tests were conducted using a Test-Analyze-and-Fix method to
ensure problems were identified and corrected [Ref: 30 :p. 1-
1]. With the results of these tests Boeing ensured Fabrique
National Herstal corrected the problems and began building
better machine guns.
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In June 1993 operational live fire testing of the
improved M3Ps was conducted at Fort Bliss, Texas. The tests
resulted in a hit percentage of better than 90% for targets at
a range of 1.5 kilometers. The users agreed this demonstrated
performance was within performance thresholds and the PM began
working on a machine gun materiel release so that M3P fielding
could begin. Fielding to the Army ADA School and the Army
Ordnance, Missile and Munitions Center is currently scheduled
to begin in March 1994. Fielding to other units is subject to
future DA approval. [Ref. 33]
From this shortcoming one can see that adding
additional requirements to an NDI may cause problems. In the
case of the Avenger Program the Army should have conducted
additional testing of the M3P during PQT. This additional
testing would have ensured that the M3P met requirements
before the Avenger system was approved for production. This
would have prevented almost four years of additional
difficulties with the fielding of the M3P machine gun.
While the major production contract for the Avenger
was an FFP contract, the contract for Avenger Test Program
Sets (TPS) was a Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract.
Avenger TPSs were maintenance test sets that were required to
interface with the Army's Integrated Family of Test Equipment
(IFTE). The TPSs consisted of Line Replaceable Unit (LRU)
test equipment, Subassembly Repairable Unit/Shop Replaceable
(SRU) test equipment and related software. The LRUs were
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major components such as the FLIR, ACE and RCU. The SRUs were
subcomponents that were used in the LRUs and the related
software was used in the IFTE. The maintenance concept called
for the Avenger LRU TPSs to be used with the IFTE at the
direct maintenance level to isolate faults in the LRUs. The
faulty LRUs would then be sent to depot level maintenance
where faulty SRUs would be isolated and repaired using SRU
TPSs.
Since these TPSs were developmental items the Army
entered into a letter contract with Boeing in May 1990 to
begin development of nine LRUs and 32 SRUs, which the PM later
changed to seven LRUs and 29 SRUs by altering the scope of the
contract through contract modifications. This letter contract
was to be definitized into a 34-month CPIF contract within 180
days, but because of problems with the contract it was not
definitized until almost half-way through the 34-month
contract period. When the contract was finally definitized,
it had a target cost of $18.6 million, a ceiling cost of $20.6
million and a minimum fee of $1.1 million. [Ref. 25]
The problems with the contract were that Boeing did
not have much experience with this type of TPS development,
and there were problems with personnel turnover on the
program. [Ref. 25] In February 1991 the MICOM Cost Analysis
Directorate began reporting to the PM and the MICOM Commanding
General that Boeing was having difficulties with the contract.
The Cost Analysis Directorate reported that with the TPS
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contract into its tenth month the contract was still
undefinitized and there was a projected $7.9 million cost
overrun. [Ref. 34]
At this time Boeing said that there were no problems
with the contract and assured the PM that the TPSs would be
developed on time and within cost. Boeing was allowed to
continue development of the TPSs and continued to assert that
there were no problems until the contract was definitized.
One month after the contract was definitized Boeing told the
PM it was experiencing developmental problems with the TPSs.
Boeing continued to work on the TPSs, but because of
the problems discussed above, Boeing was unable to develop all
of the TPSs, especially the SRU TPSs. This led the PM to
terminate Boeing's work on the SRU TPSs in October 1992 and to
direct Boeing to concentrate all further work on the LRU TPSs.
As a result of the difficulties, funds for the contract ran
out seven months from the end of the contract period and
Boeing was only able to deliver seven LRU TPSs, no completed
SRU TPSs and some incomplete software. [Ref. 25]
This shortcoming illustrates that although fixed-price
type contracts can effectively be used to acquire NDIs, any
modifications or additions that require cost-reimbursement
type contracts must be monitored closely. The Avenger
Program's TPS contract demonstrates the problems that can
develop if letter contracts are not used properly and cost-
reimbursement type contracts are not monitored closely.
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Because Boeing was performing well on the main FFP production
contract, it may have been assumed they would perform well on
the CPIF TPS contract as well. However, because none of the
TPSs were developmental items, contract performance should
have been closely monitored and actions taken to ensure the
contract was executed properly.
Another shortcoming of the Avenger Program was that
the Avenger was fielded without an Environmental Control Unit
(ECU) /Prime Power Unit (PPU). The ECU was a unit that
provided air-conditioning, heating, ventilation and
dehumidification for the gunner. The PPU was a separate power
source for the turret. Boeing's candidate Avenger did not
have an ECU/PPU, and the Army did not originally require an
ECU/PPU for the Avenger because of weight restrictions.
Although the original system requirements did not call for an
ECU/PPU, during the Persian Gulf War it was confirmed that the
turret needed an air-conditioner because of the hot climate.
Due to the urgent need to field an ECU/PPU during the
Persian Gulf War, the PM began an effort to procure an NDI
ECU/PPU. A program management official found an Alabama
company, Motivair, which specialized in air-conditioning
systems for trucks. After reviewing Motivair 's air-
conditioner, program management personnel developed a set of
specifications to meet the Persian Gulf War requirements for
an ECU/PPU. Motivair developed the ECU/PPU and the PM bought
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and fielded 182 units, but not before the Persian Gulf War was
over. [Ref l:p. 23]
After the Persian Gulf War and the urgency to field an
ECU/PPU had passed the PM began to develop a program to
procure ECU/PPUs for all Avengers. The weight of the ECU/PPU
was no longer an issue and the ECU/PPU could be added as a P3 I
because the Avenger SIP called for the Avenger to be
retrofitted with the new Heavy HMMWVs. Since the program was
a P3 I, MICOM wanted a FFP contract for the ECU/PPUs. Boeing's
version of an ECU/PPU was expensive and they would not accept
a FFP contract. The PM then put out an RFP for an NDI
ECU/PPU, and it was designated a small business set-aside with
source selection being made on a best value basis [Ref. 26].
Selection was made in January 1993 and two contractors were
requested to provide two prototypes each for competitive
Government evaluation. One contractor did not provide any
prototypes so the Government began testing the other
contractor's prototypes. Testing of these prototypes
identified several technical difficulties that the contractor
attempted to correct.
Currently, additional testing is being conducted to
ensure the technical difficulties have been corrected.
Current schedules call for ECU/PPU fielding to begin in the
first quarter of FY 1995 [Ref. 35:p. 12].
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From this shortcoming one can see that when acquiring
an NDI it may not totally meet the user's needs. This
inability to meet all user needs may lead to problems; as it
did with the Avenger's ECU/PPU during the Persian Gulf War.
Acquisition managers must realize that when dealing with NDIs
all user requirements may not be met. They should identify
any unfulfilled user needs and have a plan to deal with them,
such as a P 3 I program.
One additional shortcoming of the program was that the
Army logistics managers did not authorize any spare systems or
parts for unit fielding [Ref. 36]. This created a problem
when Avengers broke down during NET. Then other Avengers
would have to be used for spare parts to bring NET Avengers up
to operational status. This resulted in tactical unit
Avengers being inoperable for lack of spare parts.
This shortcoming illustrates that even though the
Avenger Program had a good logistical support plan for systems
that had already been fielded, there should be adequate
logistical support during the fielding period as well. A lack
of logistical support during initial system fielding and NET
could lead to training difficulties and could cause slips in
fielding schedules.
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V. LESSONS-LEARNED FROM THE AVENGER PROGRAM'S ACQUISITION
STRATEGY
A. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the Avenger Program's acquisition strategy
reveals many acquisition management lessons-learned. These
lessons-learned are not based on quantitative analysis, but
are based on a qualitative analysis of the Avenger Program's
NDI acquisition strategy and how it was implemented. The
intent is to document the lessons-learned, not to make any
conclusions about how well Avenger Program management
personnel managed the program.
The lessons-learned presented in this chapter are not all
inclusive, but are the significant ones identified from the
analysis presented in this thesis. Other lessons-learned can
be identified from a study of the individual functional areas
of the Avenger Program.
These lessons-learned are intended to help acquisition
managers and their staffs in effectively managing future NDI
acquisition programs. The lessons-learned will also be
helpful for students studying acquisition management.
61
B . LESSONS-LEARNED
The significant lessons-learned from the examination of
the Avenger Program and its NDI acquisition strategy include
the following:
• NDI acquisition strategy works well and can be used
successfully to acquire a major weapon system.
The Avenger Program has shown that a major weapon system
can be successfully acquired by using an NDI acquisition
strategy. The use of an NDI acquisition allowed the Army to
rapidly field a weapon system to fill the requirement for a
LOS-R component in the FAAD system. As the LOS-R component of
the FAAD system, the Avenger was acquired within cost and
schedule objectives and met all but one major performance
requirement. This was accomplished by taking advantage of the
NDI acquisition benefits and by overcoming NDI challenges.
• The approval and support of Congress, DoD and Army
leadership is key to the success of a program.
As with any acquisition program the approval and support
of high-level DoD leadership, Congress and the users is
important to the successful acquisition and fielding of a
weapon system. The Avenger Program received approval and
support from senior DoD leaders, Congress and Army leadership
because the acquisition officials successfully employed an NDI
acquisition strategy that resulted in the acquisition of a
system that met the mission need and that also resulted in
cost, schedule and performance objectives being met. This
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widespread approval and support was essential for the overall
success of the Avenger Program.
• The NDI acquisition strategy must be tailored to the
program .
To be successful an NDI acquisition strategy must be
tailored to the program. This is important because, to take
full advantage of NDI benefits, acquisition managers must be
allowed to structure a program differently from that of a
full-scale development program. In the Avenger Program,
program management officials ensured the acquisition strategy
outlined how the acquisition process would be tailored and
then the program was effectively implemented according to this
strategy.
• A thorough market investigation is critical when using an
NDI acquisition strategy.
A thorough market investigation is important in the use of
an NDI acquisition. The results of the market investigation
will indicate if the use of an NDI is feasible. Without this
information the decision about whether an NDI should be used
cannot be adequately made. In the Avenger Program the Army
began to investigate the possible use of a PMS early in the
acquisition process. This early investigation provided timely
information to senior acquisition managers and users with the
necessary information to base program decisions on.
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• When using an NDI acquisition strategy logistical support
planning must begin early.
When using an NDI logistical planning must begin early in
the program because of the shortened acguisition cycle. This
early logistical support planning will allow acguisition
managers time to properly plan for the support of the NDI.
Without adeguate logistical planning, system fielding may be
delayed because proper support structures may not be in place.
In the Avenger Program acguisition managers realized they did
not have adeguate logistical support planning time so they
used ICS until sufficient support planning could be completed
and a logistical support structure established.
• NDIs allow the increased use of fixed-price type contracts
that save both time and costs .
The GAO has noted that because of the reduced risk to the
Government; simpler contract procedures can be used for NDIs.
These contract procedures include increased use of fixed-price
type contracts. This was true of the Avenger Program. Army
acguisition managers were able to use an FFP production
contract for the Avenger that led to reduced contract
administration and management costs. This savings helped
ensure that program cost objectives were met.
• Selection of a dedicated contractor is important to the
accomplishment of program objectives.
One advantage of using an NDI is that the NDI contractor
usually has had some experience with the system before the
contract is awarded. The Army's selection of Boeing's Avenger
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was a good decision because Boeing had had experience with the
Avenger and several other air defense systems. This previous
experience enabled Boeing to successfully deliver the Avenger
on time and within cost.
• Do not begin full production of a weapon system until it is
fully tested.
The decision to begin full production of a weapon system
should not be made until testing is complete. During the
Avenger Program the decision was made to begin production even
though the M3P machine gun had not passed the PQT. This
decision led to many problems with the M3P that had to be
dealt with for the next four years. This demonstrates that it
is critical for all acguisition officials to understand that
a system must be fully tested before it is approved for
production.
• Program managers must monitor cost-reimbursement type
contracts closely.
While NDIs can usually be acquired using fixed-price type
contracts, some elements of an NDI program might have to use
cost-reimbursement type contracts to procure P3 I items or
other support items. These cost-reimbursement type contracts
must be monitored more closely than the fixed-price type
contracts. The Avenger Program used a CPIF contract for the
development of the TPSs. Because the TPSs were developmental
items and because a CPIF was being used, the contract should
have been monitored more closely. This increased monitoring
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could have reduced the number of problems the Government had
with the TPS contract.
• Acquisition managers must realize that NDIs may not meet all
user mission requirements.
Even though NDIs save both time and costs, they may not
meet all user needs. Performance trade-off analyses must be
conducted during the process of deciding whether to acquire an
NDI. During these analyses acquisition managers must identify
to the users what requirements may not be met. And if the
decision is made to acquire an NDI that does not meet all
critical user requirements, acquisition managers must develop
a plan to address any shortcomings. The Avenger did have
several user requirements that were not met, but the PM
developed a plan to ensure that they would be met at a later
date.
• Committed program management is critical .
A committed program management team is important to the
success of any program. Key program management personnel
should be brought on board early and kept on the program for
the duration of the program. This continuity will lead to
reduced turbulence and greatly enhance the program. Although
the responsibility for management of the Avenger was first
given to the Stinger Project Office, then moved to a separate
PM, and finally moved to the FAAD Project Office, key
personnel were kept on the Avenger Program. This continuity
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of personnel helped ensure that the Avenger Program was
managed and executed in an effective manner.
67
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that with the current emphasis on the use of
NDIs within DoD, acquisition managers will need to learn more
about how to successfully acquire them. In an effort to
provide acquisition managers with lessons-learned about NDI
acquisition this thesis has examined an example of a
successful NDI acquisition program - the Avenger Program.
This thesis has focused on NDI acquisition strategy and how
Avenger Program acquisition management officials have used
this type of strategy to field an effective weapon system.
The Avenger Program was considered a success because it
provided a system that met the user's requirements and because
it met cost and schedule objectives. The program also met all
but one of its performance objectives.
From the analysis of the Avenger Program's acquisition
strategy, the factors that made it successful, and the
program's shortcomings, it is clear that an NDI acquisition
strategy can be used to acquire a major weapon system.
However, the use of an NDI acquisition strategy for major
programs must be carefully implemented and managed.
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B. SUMMARY OF LESSONS-LEARNED
A summary of the lessons-learned from the study of the
Avenger Program is listed below.
• NDI acquisition strategy works well and can be used
successfully to acquire a major weapon system.
• The approval and support of Congress, DoD and Army
leadership is key to the success of a program.
• The NDI acquisition strategy must be tailored to the
program
.
• A thorough market investigation is critical when using an
NDI acquisition strategy.
• When using an NDI acquisition strategy logistical support
planning must begin early.
• NDIs allow the increased use of fixed-price type contracts
that save both time and costs.
• Selection of a dedicated contractor is important to the
accomplishment of program objectives.
• Do not begin full production of a weapon system until it is
fully tested.
• Program managers must monitor cost-reimbursement type
contracts closely.
• Acquisition managers must realize that NDIs may not meet all
user mission requirements.
• Committed program management is critical
.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
From the examination of the Avenger Program and its NDI
acquisition strategy the following recommendations are made:
1. The lessons-learned should be disseminated to current
and future program management personnel, as well as
other DoD acquisition officials.
69
2. DoD acquisition management officials should ensure NDIs
are considered during the Concept Exploration and
Definition phase of each major weapon system program.
3. Other NDI programs should be examined to broaden the
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Secretary of Defense
Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio
System
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2.2 pound high-explosive fragmentation
warhead
Gyro stabilized. Made of composite
material
2,568 pounds
One M3P .50-caliber machine gun
with 200 rounds basic load
1,500 meters maximum effective range
1,100 rounds per minute rate of fire
Fixed Wing AC - 10 kilometers
Rotary Wing AC - 7 kilometers
'Adopted from Avenger System Overview Briefing, Avenger
Program Office, July 28, 1993.
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Laser Range Minimum - .5 kilometers
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First Feasibility Demonstration of
Multiple Stinger Launcher
Boeing Aerospace Begins Development of
Avenger
First Prototype Avenger Firing
ADA Board Evaluates Avenger
Boeing Submits Unsolicited Proposal to
Build the Avenger
Market Investigation Completed
SECDEF Cancels Sergeant York Program
FAAD Working Group Convenes
Boeing Begins Avenger Production
Configuration
SECDEF Approves FAAD Concept
FAAD ROC Approved (Milestone IIIA)
RFP for PMS Released































Initial Avenger Contract Awarded to Boeing
Contract Award - Option II
FDT&E I Conducted
First Production Model Avenger Delivered
Contract Award - Option III
FDT&E II Conducted
First Unit Equipped (3rd ACR)
PQT Conducted
IOT&E Conducted




Contract Award - Option IV (Army
Authorizes Production Increase From Five
to 12 Avengers Per Month)
Option III Deliveries Start
First Avengers Are Deployed toSouthwest
Asia in Support Of Operation Desert Shield
Boeing Provides Condensed Avenger NET to
4-5 ADA in Preparation for Operation
Desert Shield Deployment
4-5 ADA and 3rd ACR deploy Southwest Asia
in Support of Operation DesertShield
Initial Operational Capability Achieved
Contract Award - Option V












Option IV Deliveries Start
Multiyear Procurement Contract Awarded to
Boeing
M3P Reliability Test Conducted
Option V Deliveries Start
Second M3P Reliability Test Conducted
Multiyear Procurement Contract Deliveries
Start
M3P Customer Test Conducted
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